This paper presents two examples taken from industrial case-studies that have been specified using an event system approach. Component specifications, taking the form of pre-post formula, have been derived. Constraints which ensure the correctness of the whole process are given.
Introduction
Our purpose is to present a methodological process which can be used for an entire system development. We define a system according to the properties it must satisfy and express them in a formal way. This process leads us to build two sorts of mathematical models: event models and operational models. They define the formal specification of the entire system. These models are proved to be consistent and the correctness of the whole process is ensured, i.e. the correctness of the implementation of each component and the correctness of the implementation of the entire system. The applications we have in mind heavily interact with their environment. They may use existing hardware and software components. Addressed issues: A first issue is the big quantity of information required by this kind of specification, which makes necessary to introduce a certain hierarchy into the expressed ideas. This is done in two ways: by defining the more abstract aspects and gradually focusing upon details; and by grouping properties into specific categories (properties which describe the interactions between components and with the environment, and properties which are local to one component, like functional properties). We use refinement techniques [Back 88] , [Morg 90] , , [But 96] to support the abstraction i.e. to introduce details and to express some design decisions. A second issue is how to specify interactions of a system with its environ-ment. The trend is to build a closed model which includes the whole environment. However, this model can be extremely complex. In our approach, we develop a closed model which specifies only the interactions of the system with the environment. Furthermore, refining a closed system might lead to a program failing to implement the specification we have in mind [Lop, Sim, Don 00] . Choices: The formal specification language must allow the expression of nondeterministic specifications and has to be supported by efficient proof assistants, So we neither combine different logic nor introduce new ones. We largely rely on existing proven methods backed by tools. We adopt the set theory as well as the refinement techniques as they are encapsulated in the actual tools [Atelier B] , [B Toolkit] . Process: We start from an informal specification written in a natural language which describes all the properties the system must satisfy. Domain experts participate in the elaboration and validation of this document. When system details are introduced, some implementation choices can be made: for example re-using existing devices with well-defined interfaces. Then we build, step by step, an event model which only describes the interactions of the system with its environment and between the different components. It expresses the hypothesis that we make on the environment. We only keep from the initial properties those that express interactions. This process is controlled by event refinement techniques as defined in [Lam, Sha 90] , [But 96] , , [Back, Kur 88] . After this, the event model is transformed into a shared module which is used in the specification of components. This module provides the external and internal communications mechanisms of the system. It is called interface module. Roughly speaking, by module we mean a set of program specifications which can be refined to sequential program implementations.
Finally, the specification of each component is written separately. It incorporates the properties of the informal specification related to only to this component, and which therefore, have not yet been taken into account. Component specifications are used as the starting point for the usual refinement process for sequential programs [Back 88 ], .
The correctness of the whole process is presented in [Lop 02] . In this article, the conditions that ensure this correctness will only lightly be touched upon. In the rest of this paper, we treat two examples extracted from industrial case-studies which are specified and partially proven using [Atelier B] . They are presented in the syntax of this tool and some comments are added to help the reader. However, the B method does not include two important notions we use: shared modules and auxiliary variables. These notions are introduced and formally defined in [Lop 02] . They tend to extend the utilization of the B method to concurrent systems and distributed systems. The first example illustrates the way we use to specify a large system. The second example illustrates the way we use to derive component specifications. The event specification of this example is detailed in [Lop, Sim, Don 00] .
An event based specification: The passenger exchange function of the Météor Metro Line
Meteor is a new and totally automated metro line built in Paris. The line is formed by trains and arrival/departure platforms. Trains and platforms have doors. The passenger exchange function 1 must ensure the passengers' safety, which is built upon four independent principles that can be expressed as follows: P0 An exchange cannot generate an unsafe situation. P1 To guarantee the passengers' safety, it is necessary to ensure the immobility of the train during the exchange. P2 Passengers are safe if the trains and the platforms are closed universes. P3 If a dangerous situation occurs, the passengers should have the possibility of leaving the train at any time to get a safe environment. Several kinds of passenger exchanges can be identified: the usual ones, and emergency evacuations which happen when a dangerous situation is detected. Such an evacuation has to be launched as soon as a danger occurs 2 .
Recalls
Events. An event specification takes the form ∃a. G(x, a) ∧ A(x, a, x ). The guard constraints the occurrence of the event and the action specifies its effect. The variable a allows to express the external non-determinism, i.e., external values provided by the environment. The guard G(x, a) defines the states in which the event can be observed, the action A(x, a, x ) relates system states before and after the observation. The concrete syntax of an event (in ) is any a where G(x, a) then S x,a where S x,a is the generalized substitution which is a translation of A (x, a, x ) .
and E 2 (w, w ) be of the form ∃a. G 2 (w, a) ∧ A 2 (w, a, w ), the specifications of two events. They are defined on two different state spaces. Let J(x, w) be a total relation defined between these two spaces, the formula (x , w ) expresses the fact that all state changes observed with E 2 are also observed with E 1 .
Event
System. An event system Ss = (x, IS, C, E i ) is formed by a shared variable x that represents the system state, an invariant IS that expresses static properties of the system, the specification C that initializes the system and the set of events E i for i ∈ 1..n that defines the dynamics. Such systems are transition systems, whose initial states are defined by the initialization, and whose transitions are defined by the events. System Consistency. An event system is said to be consistent if the invariant is established by the initialization and preserved by each event. System Refinement. Let S 1 and S 2 be two event systems, let J(x, w) be a total relation between their variables, S 1 is refined by S 2 (S 1 J S 2 ) if each event of S 2 is a refinement of the corresponding event of S 1 , and if the initialization of S 2 is a refinement of the initialization of S 1 . The corresponding proof obligations are generated by the actual tools. Adding new events. According to , [Lop 02] , it is possible during a refinement:
• to add new events. For this, we have just to assume that the new event is present in the abstract system with true ∧ skip as its specification. skip means that the new event does not modify any variable of the abstract system. This means that when a new variable is introduced, the refinement must include all the events which modify this variable. This constrains the way events are introduced.
• to split an event. This decomposition allows us to observe an event with greater precision. In order to do this, it suffices to assume that in the abstract system, the abstract event E is duplicated as many times as needed and that each event in the decomposition must be a refinement of E.
First model
This model introduces the main notions of the system: trains tt, platforms qq, and their possible states (variables): unsafe (td, qd) or safe (tt − td,− qd) . At this level, only the property P0 can be expressed. We can observe five events:
-UnsafeTrain, SafeTrain which modify the variable td.
-UnsafePlatf, SafePlatf which modify the variable qd.
-Transfer which has no effect upon the environment and can be activated at any time.
Note that Transfer can occur at any time and not only in a safe situation. Note also that the property P0 is expressed by the fact that the action of Transfer does not modify the system state. 
SafeTrain= /* An unsafe train becomes safe */ SafePlatf= /* q1 becomes safe */ ANY t1 WHERE t1 ∈ td ANY q1 WHERE q1 ∈ qd
END; END
The proofs of consistency of this model are generated and discharged by the Atelier B. We can prove additional properties using this model. For example, deadlock freeness is implied by the fact that under the invariant, the disjunction of the guards is always true. We can also prove properties of event traces the system should allow: for instance, Transfer can be observed at any time.
Second model
This model introduces the notion of locked train needed to express property P1. A locked train is totally stopped and to start moving, some actions need to be executed before.
The variable ti models the set of locked trains. Hence, two new events LockedTrain and UnlockedTrain are introduced.
At this level, we want to observe separately two kinds of exchanges : normal exchanges and other cases. To differentiate these two cases, we distinguish those trains which are doing a passenger exchange in normal conditions: variable ttv. This partition is done by decomposing the event Transfer of the previous model into two events EndPassExch (normal exchange) and Transfer1 (other exchanges). An event, StartPassExch, must be added to modify ttv. It allows to observe the beginning of a normal passenger exchange.
A normal exchange is done when a train is in ttr. Hence, ttv only includes trains which satisfy this property. To express this, we introduce a partial function t q from trains to platforms, the variable qtv denotes the set of trains which are doing a passenger exchange in the normal conditions. StartPassExch is activated if the train is stopped in front of a platform, and hence, t q appears in its guard. Other events that modify this variable are introduced: DepartureFromPlatf and ArrivalToPlatf.
Property P1 is an invariant of the system. The first four events of the system M eteor1.1 are included here in addition to the events that we have just introduced. The first four events are still not synchronized. The new events are synchronized as follows:
The guarantee of this synchronization is obtained by proof obligations involving only guards. 
ArrivalToPlatf= DepartureFromPlatf= /* A train arrives to a (free) platform */ /* A train is leaving a platform */
Third model
In this model, we observe the normal openings of the doors. It introduces the safety property P2 which can be rewritten as follows: (P2.1) a train which is not closed is in a passenger exchange state, (P2.2) a platform which is not closed is a platform on which a passenger exchange is currently taking place or which is in a safe state. We introduce open trains to and open platforms qo as well as four events OpenedTrain, ClosedTrain, OpenedPlatf, ClosedPlatf, which modify these variables. These events detail the transition StartPassExch → EndPassExch. Their guards define the following synchronization:
The doors of a platform are opened only if the platform is safe. Here, we introduce the variable qs and, therefore, two events SafeZone and UnsafeZone which allow to modify this variable. These events detail the opening process of a platform. SafeZone must occur before OpenPlatf and UnsafeZone before ClosedPlatf. SYSTEM M eteor1.3 VARIABLES td, qd, t q, ttr, ttv, qtv, ti,  to, qo, /* Opened trains and platforms */ qs, /* safe platform zones */ to, ttr, ttv, td, ti, qo, qtv, qd, qs 
OpenedPlatf= /* q1 becomes opened */ ClosedPlatf= /* q1 becomes closed */
SafeZone= /* q1 zone becomes safe */ UnsafeZone= /* q1 zone becomes unsafe */ ANY q1 WHERE q1 ∈∧ q1 / ∈ qs ANY q1 WHERE q1 ∈ qs THEN qs := qs ∪ {q1} THEN qs := qs − {q1} END; END;
Fourth model
In this model, we introduce the property P3 and we observe an emergency evacuation. In this case, passengers have to leave the train, so the train state must allow the opening of the doors, and an access to a safe circulation zone must also be provided. All of the trains which are in an emergency evacuation are modeled by the variable teu. We have two events which allow us to observe the beginning and the end of an emergency evacuation: StartEva and EndEva. New notions: the evacuation zones ze, and among them, the subset of evacuation zones which are safe zs. We must be able to locate a train with respect to the evacuation zones; this is the role of the function t z. The events which modify t z (ArrivingZoneEva and LeavingZoneEva) and zs, (SafeZoneEva and UnsafeZoneEva) are introduced. The localization of platforms into the evacuation zones is defined by the relation q z.
As previously, the event Transfer1 is decomposed into two events : EndEva 
[zs] /* (P 3.1) */ ran(q z) = ze /* (P 3.2) */ t q, t z, to, ttr, ttv, teu, td, ti, qo, qtv, qd, qs, zs : 
INITIALISATION
THEN SKIP /* The transfer is finished */ END; ArrivingZoneEva= /* t1 arrives in a zone */ LeavingZoneEva= /* t1 leaves z1 */
SafeZoneEva= /* z1 becomes safe */ UnsafeZoneEva= /* z1 becomes unsafe */
THEN zs := zs ∪ {z1} END; THEN zs := zs − {z1} END;
The other kind of passenger exchanges are introduced using a similar pro-cess.
Conclusion
What we obtain at this point is a formal description of the required behavior of the system. It takes the form of an event model. This model describes an automaton representing the external behavior. Some safety properties specify the static of the system, the others specify the dynamic. Here, P1, P2 and P3 are static, P0 is dynamic. Static properties are embedded in the invariant. The final specification has a lot of events which have been gradually introduced, thanks to the event refinement mechanism. This top down analysis leads us to introduce system details, though the order of insertion between properties which have a similar abstraction level is more or less arbitrary. For instance, the introduction of emergency evacuations could be done before or at the same time as normal exchanges. Furthermore, the refinement process allows us to split the proofs of consistency of the final event system. Event Synchronization is distributed through the guards.
This application has been developed under AtelierB. Almost all the generated proof obligations have been automatically discharged.
However, we do not yet have the internal architecture of the system. The isolation of each component has not yet been done and, moreover, for each component, we do not have an implementation. In order to illustrate the whole process, we will present a second application which has been taken to the point of implementation.
Flight Warning System (FWS): The event model

Introduction
This case-study -the flight warning system (FWS) used in the airbus A340 aircraft-was proposed by the Aerospatiale Company. FWS's role is to monitor aeroplane subsystems. When an abnormal situation appears, FWS must decide on when, and how, to emit warning signals. One of the difficulties of this study comes from an imposed constraint on the final architecture: the system must be formed by two cyclic concurrent processes. The first one, P1, deals with examining all the alarms. If an alarm is detected "present", this process confirms it after a pre-defined period of time. If an alarm is detected 'absent', it removes it from the set of confirmed alarms. The second process, P2, has also to examine all the alarms. It is charged with emitting signals associated to the alarms which have been confirmed by the first process.
Since the two cycles are concurrent it is not possible to specify the application as being the following sequence: P1 ; P2. We have to allow for the fact that an alarm is examined by P2 before P1, therefore, in this case, no signal will be emitted. Let us imagine one alarm a being activated at a time t. Six cases are possible: (i) t ...P1 ...P2: the alarm a 'happens' before its examination by P1 and P2. The alarm is treated by P1 during its running cycle and is treated by P2. A signal is emitted 3 .
(ii) t ...P2 ...P1: the alarm a happens before its examination by P1 and P2. The alarm is treated by P2. As a has not yet been examined by P1, no signal is emitted during the running cycle of P2. A signal for a will be emitted during the next cycle of P2 except if P1, during its own next cycle, examines a before P2 and detects that a is absent.
(iii) P1 ...P2 ...t or P2 ...P1 ...t: a will be treated by the two processes during their next cycles.
(iv) P1 ...t ...P2: same as situation 3.
(v) P2 ...t ...P1: during its running cycle, P1 examines and confirms a. P2 will treat a during its next cycle (unless P1 detects absence of a).
The Event model
Here, we present a simplified version of the case study which does not cover details concerning the flying phases and the signal composition. A complete description is given in , . The role of the event specification is to model the interactions between components and the environment. To do so, we need the set of alarms WW and the set of signals Ss, and the following variables: wp: set of emitted alarms, se: set of emitted signals, wc: set of confirmed alarms, W e1, W p1: alarms examined and detected present by P1 W e2, W c2 alarms examined and detected confirmed by P2. Num1: counter. Number of executed cycles of P1. Num2: counter. Number of executed cycles of P2.
With this model, we observe the following: the beginning of presence (NewWarning) and the end of presence (EndWarning) of a warning situation (interaction with the environment), the beginning of the emission (EmittedSignal) and the end (EndSignal) of a signal (interaction between P2 and the environment), the confirmation (ConfirmWarning1) and its end (AbsentWarning1) of an alarm (interaction between P1 and P2), the examination (ExamineWarning1) of an alarm by P1 (interaction between P1 and the environment), the examination (ExamineWarning2) of an alarm by P2 (interaction between P2 and the environment), the beginning of a new cycle of P1 (BeginCycle1), the beginning of a new cycle of P2 (BeginCycle2).
This event model is built as explained in the previous section. Note that interactions between P1 and P2 are achieved via the variable wc which is modified by P1 and is accessed by P2. Note also that the events BeginCycle1 and BeginCycle2 remove at once all the elements of respectively we 1 , wp 1 and we 2 , wc 2 : they model the beginning of each cycle. As indicated in the guards (we 1 = W w and we 2 = W w), these events can be activated only when all alarms have been examined by each process.
From event models to modules: Introduction
The event system FWS2 models the interactions of the system with the environment and between the two processes P1 and P2. We will now illustrate, along with this example, the end of the process: going from this event system to the specification of each component and to the specification of the interface module.
In order to do so, we have first to transform the event system into a module which will be shared by the components. Its role is to provide each component with the operations it needs in order to interact with the environment: this is the interface module. The specification of each component is not directly derived from the event model. It must be elaborated separately and it must contain the properties characterizing the component on its own. Don't forget that these properties have not been taken into account in the event model. Here component specifications can use some variables of the interface module. By doing so, we can relate local properties of the component to the expected behaviour of the whole system. This specification can later be refined in order to obtain its implementation.
We will now illustrate this part of the process step by step. Modules and operations. A module specification MS = (x, IM, A, O i ) is formed by a shared variable x that represents the module state, an invariant IM that expresses static properties of the module, the specification A that initializes the module and the set of operations O i for i ∈ 1..n that defines the dynamics. Each operation O i takes the form of a pre-post specification (P i (x), Q i (x, x )). In the syntax of the tool, it takes the form Pre P (x) THEN S where S is a generalized substitution. As there is a translation of generalized substitution into before-after predicates , it corresponds to the usual pre-post formulation for program specification. Such modules are transition systems, whose initial states are defined by the initialization, and whose transitions are defined by the operations. From this semantic point of view, modules and event systems are equivalent. Consistency of a module. A module is said to be consistent if the invariant is established by the initialization and preserved by each operation. Refinements. A module M is refined by M 1 if each operation of M is refined by the corresponding operation of M 1 and if the initialization of M is refined by the initialization of M 1. An operation, this is, a program specification (P, Q), is refined by another one (R, S) if for all program t, {R} t {S} implies {P } t {Q}. These proof obligations are generated by the tools. There is a semantic difference between an operation and an event: refining a program specification allows to weak the pre-condition whereas refining an event allows to strength the guard. Module implementations. Let M be a module (x, IM, A, O i ) . An implementation of M is a set of programs t 0 , t 1 , ..., t n such that:
Those conditions plus the consistency of M , implies the following property: For all M we have {true} t 0 ; M(t 1 , . . . , t n ){IM} where M is a combination with if then else, while, sequence (;) and operations O i . In other words, the invariant is satisfied by all module states. Module importation. We can import a module to implement another one .
Let M be the same module as before and
If the imported module M has an implementation i.e. a set of programs t 0 , t 1 , ..., t n such that: {true} t 0 {A ∧ IM}, and {IM ∧ P i } t i {IM ∧ Q i }, the conditions above ensure that, for all M:
5 Towards an interface module: first step
Transformation of an event into an operation
An event system specification allows us to observe a complete system -a system which does not interact with the observer. So, a system specification models a closed universe. A program taking inputs and producing outputs is not a closed universe. The way to connect these two approaches is to consider the event system as a tool to observe the program behaviour. This is the case if each transition allowed by an operation is also a possible transition of the event which corresponds to this operation [Lop, Sim, Don 00] , [Lop 02 ]. Then, to transform a system into a module, it suffices to transform each event:
We can freely add output parameters. It is obvious that in this case, the event system and its corresponding module define the same transition system.
More complex translations can be done between events and operations. In these cases, some proof obligations have to be generated and discharged. For more details, see [Lop 02 ], chapter 5.7.
Application to FWS
The module interface is obtained from FWS2 following the translation defined above. VARIABLES wp, se, wc, N um1, W p1, W e1, W c2, W e2, Num2 INVARIANT wp, wc, W p1, W e1, W c2, W e2 wp, se, wc, Num1, W p1, W e1 W c2, W e2, Num2 : 6 Toward an interface module: second step
MACHINE FWS ENV
⊆ W w ∧ se ⊆ Ss ∧ Num1, Num2 ∈ NAT INITIALIZATION(wp = ∅ ∧ se = ∅ ∧ wc = ∅ ∧ Num1 = 0 ∧ W p1 = ∅ ∧ W e1 = ∅ ∧ W c2 = ∅ ∧ W e2 = W w ∧ Num2 = 0
Logical and abstract variables
All module variables are used to express properties. Some of them model objects which will be effectively implemented by the program -they are named abstract variables, and have an operational content. Others are only logical -they are called logical or auxiliary variables [Aba, Lam 88] . Abstract variables are the only ones transformed during the module refinement process. They are implemented as well as data-refined. Logical variables will not appear in the final implementation. Let M be a module which contains abstract variables (a) and logical variables (l). Let M 1 be the module obtained from M when all the expressions where logical variables appear, are eliminated. We want to take, as an implementation of M , any implementation of M 1. This is possible if each operation O M of M is of the following form: (a, l, l ) ) and satisfies : (a, l, l ) ). Consider now the corresponding operation in M 1 . It takes the form: q(a, a ) ).
So we have:
(i) as soon as O M can be activated, O M 1 can also be activated (the precondition has been constrained).
(ii) abstract variables a, a do not depend on logical variables (but l may depend on a). This interface module is the effective interface module. NewWarning and EndWarning are implemented by the devices which detect warning situations (sensors and other electronic devices); EmittedSignal and EndSignal are implemented by output devices; ExamineWarning1 is implemented by a mechanism provided by the environment to obtain inputs and so on...
Note that BeginCycle1 and BeginCycle2 have disappeared. They are, in fact, logical operations which formally express the necessity of examining all the alarms. They have a logical control role.
Component specification
Sharing
At this point, we have an interface module which provides the communication operations of the system. We have now to write the component specifications. In this application, we want: 1-to have the interface module E=(x, IE, A, V i ) . 2-to model each component in a separate and independent module: M 1 = (x, y, IM 1 , A 1 , W i ) and M 2 = (x, z, IM 2 , A 2 , S i ). By independent, we mean that the consistency is proved independently for each module. It also means that each module has to be refined independently. 3-to force each module to be implemented using an import of the same interface module E. E becomes a shared module. 4-to preserve the correctness. By correctness, we mean that every interleaving of calls of programs realizing M 1 and M 2 operations (which modify interface variables through operation calls of E) establishes both the invariants of M 1 and M 2 . Formally: for every program t V j which realizes V j and for every combination N 1 of t V j and N 2 of t V j we must have:
As E needs to be shared by M 1 and M 2 , the correctness cannot be expressed locally on each component module. This is clearly not true in general: as M 1 and M 2 can share variables of E, an operation of M 2 can break the invariant of M 1 and vice-versa.
To avoid this problem, one solution is the following: • For each component M j we must identify the set of operations O j of E which are exclusively used by M j . O j is the set of operations that M j will be allowed to use.
• Let R j be the set of variables modified by O j , R j ⊆ x. R j is the set of variables that can be used by M j .
Application to FWS
We are able now to model the two processes P1 and P2. We focus on P2, the model of P1 can be made in the same way. First we have to extract the FWS ENV operations which will only be used by the process P2. Another property is, that during each cycle, all the alarms must be examined. This is expressed by W e2 = W w. We use here logical variables. As the process P2 is cyclic, the module includes only one operation Cycle2 with a true pre-condition and which models a step of the cycle. All the properties of the module are expressed into the invariant -the post-condition of Cycle2 just establishes the invariant and counts the number of steps. (INV ARIANT ∧ Num2 = Num2 0 + 1)
END
Note that the variable Num2, which is incremented by each cycle, forces each implementation of Cycle2 to behave correctly: if this increment does not occur, a refinement of Cycle2 by skip would still be correct. When Num2 is incremented, the following happens: Num2 is a variable "coming" from FWS ENV, hence each implementation of Cycle2 will call BeginCycle2 as it is the only operation of FWS ENV which modifies Num2. Each implementation must reestablish the invariant, as it is the post-condition of Cycle2. And, in particular, it must establish W e2 = W w. This can only be done by as many calls to ExamineWarning2, as the number of alarms in W w.
Conclusion
A first result of this work is to propose a method which takes into account the entire development of a system. This method has been used to model two industrial case studies. We have used the existing tools (in our case Atelier B) to formally prove a large part of the proof obligations generated by the method and which is actually supported by these tools. Almost all the generated proof obligations have been automatically discharged (around 85 %). The new notions : logical variables, shared modules and event-to-operation transformations, generate new proof obligations. They are not supported by the actual tools ; these proof obligations have been proved "by hand". The fact that it has been used on industrial cases, shows that the proposed method is suitable to treat large-scale systems. Secondly, what is interesting is that these new notions solve the problems met in previous works, when we tried to model applications of this kind with only the notion of module . Another point of interest is that these extensions do not represent a profound modification to the existing theory. Hence, their incorporation into existing tools can be achieved.
Further work has to be done to improve ( to refine) the conditions we have formulated in order to ensure the correctness of the whole process.
